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COMMENT

USDI'S OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
LEASE SALE IN THE BEAUFORT SEA CONTESTED

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: Department of Interior's outer continental
shelf lease sale in the Beaufort Sea off the northern coast of Alaska is
challenged by Alaskan native villages and environmental groups alleging
that the Beaufort Sea is an environmentally sensitive area. The Secretary of Interior's actions in regard to the lease sale were held to effectuate the will of the legislature in balancing the quest for oil and gas
with its attendant impact on Native American cultures. North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus, Village of
Kaktovik v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
The coastal zone is subject to unusual pressures, both from natural
causes and human activities. The land and water resources which support the environments and economies of coastal communities are in
danger of depletion .... I support efforts to improve our understanding
of these coastal issues, and I heartily endorse the designation by conservation organizations of the year 1980 as the "Year of the Coast."
President Carter's Environmental Message to Congress, August 2, 1979.
THE SETTING

The Beaufort Sea Lease Sale is an example of an environmental
shotgun approach to halt resource development in an environmentally sensitive area. Plaintiff's arsenal was comprised of congressional
environmental enactments such as the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,1 the Endangered Species Act, 2 the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 3 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 4 While
these environmental mandates are important to the disposition of
this case, the federal trust responsibility that the United States may
hold toward the Eskimos and their culture is unique. If trust duties
exist, the scope of those federal fiduciary duties will determine future
regulations concerning the conservation of marine mammals. Any
regulation of the whale will have important economic and political
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effects on the Inupiat Eskimos, subsistence hunters who for centuries
have depended upon the Bowhead whale.
The Beaufort Sea touches northern Alaska from Point Barrow eastward into Canada. "The environment of the Beaufort Sea region is
dark and hostile; frigid temperatures prevail throughout much of the
year .... Life is nasty, brutish, and sometimes short."'

The Eskimos

who inhabit this precarious northern slope of North America depend
upon the bounty of the Beaufort Sea for their existence.
The Beaufort Sea region is permanent or migratory home to various animal species. Principal among the migratory animals is the Bowhead whale, which migrates through the Beaufort Sea in spring and in
autumn. The Bowhead, which falls under the special protection of
the Endangered Species Act, supplies half of the meat needed by the
inhabitants of nine whaling villages along Alaska's northern coast. 6
During their yearly six to eight week spring hunt, native Alaskans
arm themselves with nineteenth century weapons and undertake their
search for the Balaena mysticetus, or Bowhead whale. Whaling is a
way of life for these Alaskans. Elaborate rituals, magic songs, and traditions exemplify the symbiotic relationship between the Inupiat
whalers and the Bowhead whale. 7 Without the preservation of the
Bowhead, the Eskimos' way of life would be severely threatened.
The Beaufort Sea is also rich in oil and gas deposits, and the Department of Interior (DOI) scheduled it for a lease sale in December
1979. Local Alaskan groups challenged the DOI, alleging violation of
federal protection statutes and requesting that the DOI be enjoined
from proceeding with the sale. In October 1980, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Secretary
of Interior had successfully balanced congressional intent to develop
national oil resources with environmental concerns and allowed the
lease sale to continue.
LEGISLATION
Controversies such as that involving the Beaufort Sea sale have
been anticipated by Congress. Recognizing the need to strike a balance between conflicting goals of environmental protection and economic development, Congress passed a variety of legislation designed
to satisfy both. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
5. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
6. The nine whaling villages are Barrow, Point Hope, Gambell, Savoohga, Wales, Kivalina,
Wainwright, Kaktovik and Nuiqsut. See 43 Fed. Reg. (1978) for information on the hunting
seasons of these villages.
7. Rosenblatt, The Federal Trust Responsibility and Eskimo Whaling, 7 B. C. ENVT'L.
AFF. L. REV. 505, 506 (1979).
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(NEPA) declares that "a national policy will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; ... prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and ... stimulate the
health and welfare of man; enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation." 8 NEPA establishes guidelines for ensuring "that a detailed environmental assessment is made before implementing major federal projects which
could significantly (affect) the quality of the human environment." 9
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)' 0 was enacted in 1973 "to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve
the purposes of (other treaties and conventions)."' '
The development of the Beaufort Sea could endanger the existence
of the Bowhead whale, which is listed as an endangered species under
the ESA." 2 In 1970, the United States added the Bowhead whale,
and the seven other largest whale species to its endangered species
list.' So exploited that it was economically and biologically depleted
by the early years of the 20th century, the Bowhead today remains
the most endangered species of whale. Other wildlife in possible jeopardy include polar bears, gray whales, migratory birds, and fish,
which are all intended to receive special protection by statute and international treaty.' '
Even earlier, Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA) in 1953' ' "to assert federal jurisdiction over lands
1
lying seaward of a three mile coastal zone given to the states."' 6
Under the act, the Secretary of Interior was vested with authority to
lease OCS lands for mineral exploration and to prescribe rules and
regulations necessary to administer leasing of the OCS. The few
guidelines in the act itself left the Secretary with wide discretion. Be8. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
9. Id.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
11. Other treaties and conventions listed in the ESA are migratory bird treaties with
Canada and Mexico, the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan, the Convention
on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, the International
Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, the International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific Ocean, and the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Id. § 1531(a)(4)(A)-(F).
12. Id.
13. SOC.F.R. § 17.11 (1980).
14. Id.
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
16. Id.
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cause local governments and affected coastal states alleged that they
were not adequately involved in the decision-making process of
coastal development, the act was amended in 1978. The amendment
to the OCSLA set out significant policy objectives which include rapidly making oil and other natural resources available to meet domestic needs, balancing economic development with protection of the
environment, and providing coastal states with an opportunity to
participate in any planning decisions relating to the resources of the
outer continental shelf.' ' The OCSLA directed the Secretary to
conduct a study of any area or region included in any oil and gas
lease sale in order to establish information needed for assessment
and management of environmental impacts in the human, marine,
and coastal environment of the OCS and the coastal areas which may
be affected by oil and gas development in such area or region.' 8
Under the OCSLA, the Secretary is empowered to cancel a lease if he
determines, after a hearing that
(i) continued activity.., would probably cause serious harm or
damage to life, to property, to any mineral,... or to the mar-

ine, coastal or human environment;
(ii) the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or decrease to
an acceptable extent within a reasonable period of time; and
(iii) the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantages of continuing such lease or permit in force.' 9
PROCEEDINGS
Against this legislative background, the court of appeals determined that the Secretary of Interior may undertake all lawful activities of the lease phase of the Beaufort Sea region. The Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) had proposed this area for lease sale development of oil and gas as early as November 1974. The documents in
proceedings before the court of appeals' decision are voluminous.
In 1979, before the courts were involved, a coalition of 33 environmental, conservation and wildlife groups and an Alaskan organization
urged President Carter to order the DOI to cancel its plans to hold
the OCS oil and gas lease sale in the Beaufort Sea. The coalition
claimed that the delicate Arctic environment could not withstand the
environmental risks of oil and gas drilling.2 0
Despite those strong pleas, the Secretary of Interior, Cecil D.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. § 1332(1)-(5).
Id. § 1346(a)(1).
Id. § 1334(a)(2)(A).
B.N.A. 10 ENVIR. REP. 1501 (1979).
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Andrus, and Governor Jay Hammond of Alaska agreed to proceed
offering offshore oil and gas leases in the nearshore waters of the
Beaufort Sea. A total of 17 tracts covering 5 14,202 acres were offered for sale. 2' This was the first sale in the Arctic area. Secretary
Andrus gave his assurance that the DOI had taken a cautious approach to this undertaking, and that "very stringent requirements
(would be) placed on the lessees in order that the rich biological resources of the area, which are intimately linked to the way of life of
the Inupiat Eskimo, would not be put in jeopardy."'2 2
Three suits were filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia23 to enjoin the Department of Interior's December 11 sale of the OCS leases. On December 7, 1979, the court denied
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the lease
sale. The court reasoned that immediate relief was not necessary because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the probability of irreparable harm. On January 22, 1980, the court ruled on cross motions
for summary judgment in separate actions brought by the North
Slope Borough, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Village of
Kaktovik against Cecil D. Andrus.
The plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction, alleging violations
of a federal trust responsibility to Native Americans, ESA, NEPA,
OCSLA, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 2" the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 2 s and an agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. 2 6 The district court granted plaintiffs' motions
for summary judgment under the federal trust responsibility of
NEPA2 ' and Sections 7(a)(2) and 7(b) of the ESA.2 8 All other
claims were granted in favor of the defendants. The Secretary was enjoined from accepting bids for the OCS lease sale until requirements
of the trust responsibility, the NEPA, and the ESA were met.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
issued an opinion on October 9, 1980,29 holding that the "Secretary
21. The Geological Survey estimates that undiscovered resources from .5 billion to 1.25
billion barrels of oil and from .87 trillion to 3,125 trillion cubic feet of gas may lie in the
proposed sale area, which includes both state, federal, and disputed land. Id. at 1502.
22. Id.
23. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus, and Village
of Kaktovik v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1979).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976 & Supp. t1 1979).
26. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 339 (D.D.C. 1979).
27. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, as they related to claims under the Federal Trust Responsibility, Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, and
Sections 7(a)(2) and 7(b) of the Endangered Species Act, were granted.
28. Id.
29. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. C. 1980).
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may undertake, and permit to be undertaken all lawful activities attendant upon the 'lease' phase of the Beaufort Sea Oil and Gas Project.",

3

0

THE LEASE STAGE
The court of appeals emphasized that "drilling may still be at least
two years away and will remain subject both to routine and extraordinary administrative and judicial review."'" Once the leases are accepted by the Secretary, the lessees must adhere to federal law, department regulations, and lease stipulations by engaging only in
preliminary activities. Only "[g] eological, geophysical, and other surveys necessary to develop a comprehensive exploration plan" 3"2 are
allowed. The court determined that, without such preliminary activities, the Secretary would not be able to properly appraise the Beaufort Sea region development pursuant to the congressional mandate
"which established a clear program for thoughtful, graduated, and a
tightly controlled development of oil lands on the other continental
shelf of the United States." 3
Thirteen lease stipulations were drafted by the Secretary to minimize the possibility of injury to the environment in the Beaufort Sea
area. Those stipulations were published in the "Final Notice of Sale
for the Proposed Joint Federal/State Beaufort Sea Lease Sale" in the
Federal Register.3" The court specifically set apart federal stipula30. Id. at 592.
31. Id. at 593. The OCSLA provides that the "lease sale... is only a preliminary and
relatively self-contained stage within an overall oil and gas development program which requires substantive approval and review prior to implementation of each of the major stages:
leasing, exploring, producing .... " 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
32. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.D.C. 1980).
33. No "physical penetration of the seabed of greater than 300 feet of unconsolidated
formations or 50 feet of consolidated formations" would constitute a permissive preliminary activity. 44 Fed. Reg. 70238 (1979).
34. Lease Terms and Stipulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 64752, 64761-63 (1979).
Federal Stipulation No. I provides for "any site, structure, or object of historic or archaeologic significance" which may be discovered during oil and gas explorations.
Federal Stipulation No. 3 provides for restoration of an exploratory drilling site, in areas
of less than 10 meters of water depth, after drilling is completed.
Federal Stipulation No. 4 states that "[s] olid waste disposal on artificial islands or in
marine waters within the lease area is prohibited."
Federal Stipulation No. 5 provides for criteria that must be met where pipelines are required.
Federal Stipulation No. 6 provides for regulation of discharge of produced waters, drilling muds and cuttings into marine waters.
Federal Stipulation No. 8. Exploratory drilling and testing, and other downhole exploratory activities are to be limited to the period between Nov. 1 through March 31, "unless the
Supervisor determines that continued operations are necessary to prevent a loss of well control or to ensure human safety."
Federal Stipulation No. 9. Exempts lease block 700 from exploratory work.
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tions Nos. 2 and 7 as evidencing concern for the exigencies of a sensitive environment.
Federal stipulation No. 2 states that the lessee shall provide an
"environmental training program for all personnel involved in exploration or development activities." '3 Stipulation No. 7 requires that
the lessee conduct certain environmental surveys to determine the
composition of biological populations
or habitats and the effects of
3 6
oil operations on these groups.
Not only do the lessees have to fulfill the requirements of the lease
stipulations, but the Final Notice of Sale3" mandates additional obligations. 3 8 For example, the lessees must allow "free movement and
safe passage to fish and mammals, both onshore and offshore."'
The lessees must also comply with requirements for advance testing
of drilling structures. Circuit Judges Mackinna and Wilkey and United
States District Court Judge Penn found that the Secretary "has responded thoughtfully in reconciling the quest for oil with meaningful
deference to nature" 4 0 by having drafted lease stipulations and other
obligations which circumscribe the lessees' activities.
ANALYSIS
National EnvironmentalPolicy Act
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the DOL's
environmental policy impact statement (EIS) on the sale violated the
NEPA and it therefore enjoined the government from selling the OCS
leases. The district court concluded that the EIS had not adequately
analyzed the cumulative effects of the Beaufort Sea sale and other
energy projects on the North Slope of Alaska and determined that
the EIS did not amply address the use of lease stipulations as an
effective mechanism for limiting adverse environmental impacts. The
plaintiffs argued that the EIS, prepared in conjunction with the lease
Federal Stipulation No. 10 provides for royalty rates.
Federal Stipulation No. 11 provides that the "lease is subject to the 'Agreement Between
the United States and State of Alaska Pursuant to Section 7 of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, and Alaska Statutes 38.05.137,...'" and that the lessees consent to every term
of that "Interim Agreement."
Federal Stipulation No. 12. "This lease is subject to the 'Agreement Regarding Unitization for the Proposed Joint Federal/State Beaufort Sea Lease Sale' executed by the United
States and State of Alaska on October 26, 1979, and the lessee is bound by the terms of
that agreement."
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 64766.
39. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 624 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 16.
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sale, did not satisfy the requirements of Section 4332(2)(c) of NEPA.
That section requires that an EIS include an analysis of the relative
environmental merits and reasonable alternatives to any proposed
major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."
The court of appeals, agreeing with the lower court, reiterated that
the court's role is to determine "whether the EIS provides the decision maker with sufficient detail to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives so far as environmental aspects are concerned." 4 2 "Reasonable
considerations to all significant impacts is all that can be demanded
of an agency." 4 3 The appellate court then analyzed the specific holdings of the district court as they pertained to the Beaufort Sea EIS
and reversed. 4"
Cumulative Impact
Several significant federal and state energy development projects
are progressing in the North Slope region. 4" When multiple projects
will have a cumulative impact "upon a region so that the environmental consequences of a particular project cannot be considered in
isolation, the decision maker must be alerted to those cumulative impacts." 4 6 The standard used to determine if a particular EIS satisfactorily discusses environmental consequences is whether it "furnishes
such information as appears to be reasonably necessary under the circumstances for evaluation of the project." 4
The district court ruled that the EIS was inadequate because it had
failed to "alert the decision maker to the qualitative nature of likely
cumulative effects."'" The appellate court reversed this decision, referring to the EIS, which adverted to the cumulative impact of the
project on at least 16 pages. The court determined that the EIS
clearly delineated the potential harm arising from the lease sale:
The most likely effect (of all the proposed Federal and State governments' actions) will be a limiting of the subsistence lifestyle because
of less availability of some species some years, and a slightly limited
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
42. N.R.D.C v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
43. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 624 F.2d 589, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
44. The EIS, prepared by the Department of Interior, includes three volumes..
45. Drilling in Prudoe Bay, the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline, and the Tans-Alaska Pipeline are some examples.
46. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 347 (D.D.C. 1979);see: Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976).
47. N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88 (2nd Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 348. Cumulative effects on some species, such as polar bears and caribou, were
not addressed.
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habitat to hunt and fish in. This could drastically impact the Inupiat

social and physical well-being; however, the amount of this potential
change cannot be estimated.' 9
Alternatives to the Proposal
In the lower court, the plaintiffs maintained that the Beaufort Sea
EIS failed to adequately consider the following alternatives as required by NEPA:
(i) alternative energy sources
(ii) alternative mitigation measures
(iii) alternative management schemes for the Beaufort Sea area.
The NEPA provides that an agency must list and discuss proposed
alternatives to a project, including any possible environmental consequences of the alternatives." 0 The agency's determination of proposed alternatives is guided by a rule of reason; the agency itself determines how much detail to include in the EIS. A discussion of
proposed alternatives need only provide "information sufficient to
permit a reasoned choice of alternatives so far as environmental
aspects are concerned." ' 1
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs' first allegation that alternative
energy sources had been inadequately discussed. The EIS was found
to be satisfactory because NEPA requires only a "reasonable" treatment of any proposed energy source alternative. The appellate court
affirmed this ruling, stating that "[ti wenty pages of discussing a spectrum of other energy sources is plainly sufficient under NEPA." ' 2
Alternative mitigation measures were considered next by the lower
court. That court commented that the EIS did not adequately alert
the fact finder to the probable effect of each lease stipulation and to
reasonable alternative stipulations. The appellate court rejected this
ruling, asserting that "[ii t is difficult to imagine how the EIS' I could
be much more helpful than 'merely set[ting] forth the content of
each stipulation and is general rationale.' "' I The court found that
the highly restrictive nature of the lease stipulations anticipate any
environmental protective problems that may arise: "The stipulations
... are not simple elements of the decisionmaking process, but
49. EIS at 259.
50. N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2nd Cir. 1975), N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458 F.2d at 836; see: North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 332, 345 (D.D.C. 1979).
52. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 602.
54. Id.
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rather, they are complex products of decisionmaking analogous to
interlocutory decisions by the Secretary and are informed themselves
by surrounding analysis and discussion within the EIS." 5
The appellate court then considered plaintiffs' argument that the
alternative management schemes for the Beaufort Sea area were not
fully addressed. The lower court stipulated that the EIS did not include a discussion of management alternatives pursuant to other federal statutory schemes.' 6 The court found that to be crucial to holding the EIS defective. The court of appeals reversed, regarding the
Secretary's consideration of the Marine Sanctuary Act (MSA) alternative as adequate "under the instant circumstances." ' " Under the
MSA, the "Secretary of Commerce can designate portions of the
Outer Continental Shelf as marine sanctuaries, which would give the
Secretary authority to issue and enforce 'necessary and reasonable
regulations to control any activities permitted within the designated
marine sanctuary.' "' ' The appellate court affirmed the Secretary's
treatment of the MSA alternative on two bases. First, the EIS spoke
directly to such an alternative:
If the proposed Beaufort Sea area is
tuary with delegation of management
of Commerce, oil and gas operations
reduced from that which would occur
strategy of balancing conflicing uses of

designated as a Marine Sancauthority to the Department
in the area could be severely
under a national management
the area.5 9

Second, the Beaufort Sea area has never been designated as an "active
candidate" for marine sanctuary status by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, 6" and it is therefore free from any
additional environmental safeguards which could be promulgated by
the Secretary of Commerce.

Worst Case Analysis
The Council on Environmental Quality Regulations requires the
inclusion of a worst case analysis in an EIS when gaps in relevant information or scientific uncertainty exist. 6 The analysis is an assessment of worst possible impacts of drilling on the Bowhead whales
and on the Beaufort Sea environment.
55. Id.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1431-34 (1972).
57. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
58. Commonwealth v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1979), citing, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1432(f) (1972).

59. EIS at 395;see generally Id. at 393-96.
60. The sub-agency in the Department of Commerce in charge of marine affairs.
61. 40C.F.R. § 1502.2 (1980).
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The lower court determined that a worst case analysis was not required in this case because the draft EIS was prepared before the
effective date of the council's regulations.6 2 The plaintiffs still argued
in the lower court that the worst case analysis which the DOI voluntarily chose to include in its EIS was not really the worst possible
case. The appellate court affirmed the district court's holding that
"[t] he worst case analysis contained in the EIS was a reasonable
means of alerting the decision maker to the dangers presented by
proceeding in the face of uncertainty." 6 Because this opinion was
limited to the lease phase of the Beaufort Sea project, the court was
primarily concerned with the limited preliminary hazards. The appellate court reasoned that the Secretary would be able to assess a possible worst case analysis only when the location and the amount of
the oil are discovered.
The EndangeredSpecies Act
The district court held that the DOI violated the ESA because of
its failure to obtain a biological opinion from the National Marine
Fisheries Services (NMFS) concerning the possible effects of Beaufort sea oil production on the endangered Bowhead whale. A biological opinion is a statement written by the agency with jurisdiction
over an endangered species (NMFS) stating the agency's opinion of
how future action may jeopardize the continued existence of the
species. In the lower court, the plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary
had violated sections 7(a)(2), 7(b), and 7(d) of the ESA. Those sections of the ESA require that an agency not make any "irretrievable
commitment of resources" which would foreclose implementation of
alternatives to the proposed action, and that an agency not jeopardize the continued existence of the Bowhead whale. 6 4
The lower court determined that the government may pursue activ ities in the face of inadequate information if there is a reasonable
likelihood of ultimate compliance, there was no 7(d) violation, and
the intermediate steps taken pursuant to the agency action comply
with 7(a)(2). The district court found that the defendants could not
satisfy the last step of that analysis. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the ESA had not violated section 7(a)(2).
Before addressing the statutory issues, the court of appeals assessed
the scope of agency action. That court affirmed the decision that
"agency action constitutes the lease sale and all resulting activities.""
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at § 1505.12.
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 347 (D.D.C. 1979).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), § 1536(b), § 1536(d) (1973).
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 350-51.
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The lease sale and all subsequent activities were therefore held to be
subject to ESA scrutiny. The appellate court determined that satisfaction of the ESA requirements are to be "measured in view of the
full contingent of OCSLA checks and balances and all mitigating
measures adopted in pursuance thereof."6 6 As compliance with
"OCSLA makes ESA requirements more likely to be satisfied both in
an ultimate and a proximate sense," 6 the court held that the Secretary "did perform [ ] a comprehensive analysis of all the ramifications of the lease sale." 6 8
The 7(b) Biological Opinion Claim
The legislative purposes of a biological opinion, as required by the
ESA, are twofold. First, the opinion "is designed to attenuate any
conflicts between the agency action and the welfare of the endangered species." 6" Second, the opinion provides courts with substantive evidence of an agency's compliance with 7(a)(2).
The sole 7(b) issue before both courts in the instant case was
whether a November 6, 1979, letter from NMFS to the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) constituted a biological opinion within the
meaning of the act. 7" The lower court determined that the letter
failed to satisfy both the statutory requirements and the legislative
purposes of a biological opinion. The appellate court reversed this
determination because it found that the letter was intended to be a
biological opinion. 7" The letter incorporated by reference two separate biological documents, which demonstrated to the court that the
biological opinion had been carefully thought out.
The 7(d) Claim: "Irreversible or Irretrievable" Commitments
The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling that section
7(d) of the ESA had not been violated. The court determined that
the preliminary activities permitted by the lease sale did not result in
any "irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources..., which
has the effect of foreclosing ...alternative measures which avoid

jeopardizing the continued existence of any endangered or threatened
species ....,'
66. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. A November 6, 1979, letter from Mr. Terry Leitzell of N.M.F.S. to Mr. Frank Gregg,
director of B.L.M.
71. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II, 1978).
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Federal Trust Responsibility
The plaintiffs maintained that the federal government had a trust
responsibility to protect the Native Alaskans' way of life which had
been violated here. The district court, after determining that such a
trust did exist, concluded that the Secretary had shirked those trust
responsibilities by failing to comply fully with the ESA. The appellate court agreed with the district court's holding that a trust responsibility can only arise from a statute, a treaty, or an executive order.7 3
The court of appeals noted the lack of any specific provision imposing such a fiduciary relationship and held that the Secretary had
complied with the pertinent environment statutes. 7 4
The appellate court looked to the recent Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Mitchell, 7 s which held that "the United States
bore no fiduciary responsibility to Native Americans under a statute
which contained no specific provision in the terms of the statute." 7 6
The Supreme Court strictly construed the statute involved in Mitchell.
The United States appellate court noted, however, that Mitchell "left
open the questions of whether, on remand, other statutes might support the assertion of a trust responsibility, or whether a 'special relationship' between the United States and Indian tribes" could support
that claim. 7" The Supreme Court has not yet fully delineated the
facets of the United States' trust responsibility toward Native Americans. It may therefore be helpful to examine lower federal court decisions to clarify those issues.
The court of appeals considered two grounds which directly vindicated the Secretary's trust responsibility towards the Native Americans. "First, the primary threat to the Inupiats can only be viewed as
one of a possibly deleterious intrusion into their land." ' 8 Second, it
was found that the Secretary amply focused on the fears and concerns of the Inupiats in the EIS, under the headings of "Protection
of Subsistence Harvest Activities" ' 9 and "Subsistence Food Gathering Impacts." 8 The Secretary, empowered with discretion, must necessarily balance competing interests. The appellate court remarked
that such a balancing process "invokes tension and compromise of
dual values, that are disappointing in some degree. '"8
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id.
100 S.Ct. 1349 (1980).
-U.S.
-,
United States v. Mitchell,
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 611, n. 148.
Id. at 612.
EIS at 337.
Id. at 254-59.
North Slpe Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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CONCLUSION
The recent North Slope Borough decision is an illustration of a
federal appellate court's concern with legitimate environmental and
human problems along with the exploration and production of our
nation's natural resources. By enacting the ESA and NEPA, Congress
has expressed a strong public interest in ensuring the preservation of
endangered species, such as the Bowhead, and in preventing damage
to the environment. Congress mandated development of resources in
the OCS through the OCSLA because of the pressing national interest in developing available domestic energy supplies. The tension resulting from those legislative enactments was recognized by the appellate court. Referring to Mitchell, the court of appeals specifically
left open the question of whether a trust responsibility may be found
on remand given the proper showing. Either environmental statutes
or the existence of a special relationship between the United States
and Native Americans could be held to impose a trust responsibility
on the United States to protect the Eskimos' rights to subsistence
hunting. Because all parties to this action are pressing appeals, it is
necessary to examine whether a federal trust responsibility could be
found on remand on either statutory or special relationship grounds.
The appellate court noted that the lower court's rationale in North
Slope Borough8 2 is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in
U.S. v. Mitchell, wherein a majority of the court ruled that the General Allotment Act of 1887 did not unequivocally demonstrate congressional intent to create a trust for Native Americans. 8 3 The court
of appeals delineated the standard for determining the existence of a
federal trust: "Without an unambiguous provision by Congress that
clearly outlines a federal trust responsibility, courts must appreciate
that whatever fiduciary obligation otherwise exists, it is a limited one
only." 8 4 The court defined a limited fiduciary obligation and found
that the Secretary had fulfilled that obligation in this case. If a court
should ascertain on remand that a federal trust responsibility exists,
however, the Secretary will be held to a higher standard in scrutinizing the possible adverse effects that oil and gas exploration activity
would have upon the Inupiat society and upon their environment. A
higher standard of scrutiny would mean first, that environmental statutes could not be used to "undermine the subsistence cultures, 8
second, that the Secretary would have to be acutely aware of the
82. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 334 (D.D.C. 1979).
83. United States v. Mitchell,
U.S.
-,
100 S.Ct. 1349 (1980).
84. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see: United
States v. Mitchell,
- U.S.
- ,100 S.Ct. 1349, 1354-56 (1980).
85. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
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Native Alaskans' fears, concerns, and needs, and third, that the courts
would vigorously enforce environmental legislation to protect the
Eskimos' rights of subsistence hunting.
The existence of a statutory trust provision was not argued before
the court of appeals. The court did, however, recognize that "every
statute and treaty designed to protect animals or birds (e.g., Marine
Mammal Protection Act;8 6 ESA" 7) specifically exempts Native Alaskans who hunt the species for subsistence. These statutes have been
construed 8 as specifically imposing on the Federal government a
trust responsibility.... 89
In People of Togiak v. U.S., the district court for the District of
Columbia stated that "[ifn addition to ...express constitutional
power, federal authorities have long been held to have a trust responsibility toward ...Alaskan Natives." 9 0 Because the MMPA and the
ESA expressly exempt Alaskan Natives from certain environmental
responsibilities, it is clear that Congress intended that the Eskimos
continue to depend upon the bounty of the Beaufort Sea for their
existence. That exemption and the ensuing relinquishment of responsibilities should not be ignored.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA)9" could create
a stumbling block for the plaintiffs on remand. In 1976, Congress enacted the ANSCA, which extinguished "[a] 11 aboriginal titles, if any,
and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and occupancy,
including submerged land beneath all water areas, both inland and
offshore, and including any aboriginal hunting or fishing right ..
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b).
Exemptions for Alaskan Natives:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply with respect to the taking of any
marine mammal by any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo who dwells on the coast of
the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean if such taking (1) is for the subsistence purposes by Alaskan Natives who reside in Alaska, or (2) is done for
purposes of creating and selling authentic native articles of handicrafts and
clothing....
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e).
Exemption for Native Alaskans:
[p] rovisions of the chapter shall not apply with respect to the taking of any
endangered species or threatened species, or the importation of any such
species taken pursuant to this section, by (A) any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo
who is an Alaskan Native who resides in Alaska, ...
88. People of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979).
89. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Cf. North
Slpe Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
90. People of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979); see: Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 249 U.S. 53 (1918); see: Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F.
Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973).
91. 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1627 (1976).
92. Id. § 1603(b).
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Arguably, the ANSCA extinguishes all aboriginal land related claims
and any trust obligation to the Alaskans which may depend on such
land claims. The appellate court noted this possible interpretation of
the ANSCA when citing to Cape Fox Corp. v. U.S. I Nonetheless,
"the termination of a federal trust responsibility with regard to land
does not necessarily extinguish a trust relationship based on subsistence and cultural needs." 9"
A federal trust responsibility may also be enforced if there is an
adequate showing of a special relationship between the United States
and the Native Alaskans.9 s Two factors arguably support such a special relationship. First, one may analogize the fiduciary relationship
between the federal government and native Indians of the lower 48
states to the relationship between the federal government and the
Native Alaskans. Both Indians and Eskimos are included in the modern "Native American" term.9 6 Second, the historical relationship
between the federal government and the Alaskan natives is not to be
slighted. As early as 1964, Presidential concern was demonstrated for
the Alaskans' way of life. President Theodore Roosevelt, in his Fourth
Annual Message to Congress announced that "their (Native Alaskans')
country is being overrun by strangers, the game slaughtered and
driven away, the streams depleted of fish. . .. "'
If the plaintiffs on remand demonstrate congressional intent to
consider Native Alaskans' interests in preserving their delicate environment, to construe statutes in their favor, and to permit Eskimos to
continue their subsistence way of life, the special relationship strand
may be met.
We must not lose sight of the adverse impacts on the environment
and on our Native American cultures caused by oil and gas exploration. The reduction of America's dependence on insecure and costly
supplies of foreign oil is certainly a primary goal of the Department
of Interior. The multiple local, state, and federal coastal demands
must blend into a single environmental continuum. Through the en93. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 612, n. 151 (D.C. Cir. 1980); ca
Cape Fox Corp. v. U.S., 456 F. Supp. 784, 799 (D. Alaska 1978).
94. Rosenblatt, The Federal Trust Responsibility and Eskimo Whaling, 7 B. C. ENVT'L.
AFF. L. REV. 505 (1979).
95. Nathaniel Rosenblatt notes in his article that "(a) fiduciary relationship has long
been recognized between Indian tribes of the lower forty-eight states and the federal government." Id. at 528. Cf U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903); Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
96. The Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2991-2992(d) (Supp. V
1975) covers American Indians, Hawaiian Natives, and Alaskan Natives.
97. President Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 6, 1904,
reprinted in 9 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 7024, 7050 (1911); see: Act of May
17, 1884, ch. 53.
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actment of NEPA, ESA, and other environmental mandates,9 Congress has recognized its duty to safeguard the environment for the
benefit of all. Through the ESA and NEPA, Congress has expressed a
strong public interest in ensuring the preservation of endangered
species, such as the Bowhead, and in preventing damage to the environment. Congress has mandated development of resources on the
outer continental shelf by enacting the OCS because of the pressing
national interest in developing all domestic energy supplies. The
courts must continue to enforce those environmental regulations,
keeping public confidence in the energy trend in mind.
MARY ANN LOUISE GARCIA

98. Through the enactment of the Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act of
1976, U.S.C. 16 § 917 (1976), Congress extended "its authority to conserve and protect all
marine mammals, including whales, out to a two hundred nautical mile limit by enactment
of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976." The Whale Conservation and
Protection Study Act specifically considers the conservation and protection of the Bowhead
whale of particular interest. Studies are to be undertaken concerning all of the relevant factors regarding the effects of man's activities, which include disruption of migration patterns
and the introduction of pesticides and other chemicals into their habitable waters.
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 was enacted in 1972. In its findings,
Congress determined that certain species and population stocks of marine mammals may be
in danger of extinction. This depletion of marine mammals is due to man's activities, in the
rookeries, mating grounds, and other habitable areas. Congress declared in this act that
"there is inadequate knowledge of the ecology and population dynamics of such marine
mammals and of the factors which bear upon their ability to reproduce themselves successfully." U.S.C. § 1361(3). By the enactment of the MMPA, the Marine Mammal Commission
was established. The commission has the duty to recommend to the Secretary of State,
other appropriate Federal officials, and Congress such additional measures that it deems necessary in order to protect Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts whose livelihood may be adversely
affected by any actions taken pursuant to the Act.

